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Introduction 
Although the tension between the principles of paternalism and patient 
a utonomy has a long history in medicine and medical ethics , the recent 
past has seen an increasing change in emphasis in the diocction of the rights 
of patient self-determination. This should not be surprising, given the 
general socio-cultural and philosophical mood in this century which has 
placed special priority on human rights , individualism, and the 
questioning of authority. Haug a nd Lavin see the expression of this 
movement in the field of medicine as issuing in "medical consumerism, 
self-help , the patients' rights movement , and the re-evaluation of 
professional authority . . . "1 In response to this, closer scrutiny is being 
given to the concept of autonomy. This has resulted in (I) refinement in the 
definition of autonomy, (2) a greater recognition of the phenomenon of 
limited autonomy, and (3) the emergence of autonomy not only as a 
principle to be upheld, but also a goal to be achieved. 
In their survey of its historical development , Beauchamp and 
McCollough cite both acient and modern sources for the principles of 
paternalism and autonomy in medical ethics. 2 1t seems clear, however, that 
the former, which they refer to as the Beneficence Model , was earlier the 
more dominant principle. Both Beauchamp and McCollough a nd Robert 
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Veatch describe the Hippocratic Oath and the tradition which followed it 
as centered on the underlying value of beneficence. "Those who have stood 
in that tradition are committed to producing good for their patient and to 
protecting that patient from harm ."J The Hippocratic tradition , with its 
emphasis on beneficence and consequent tendency toward paternalism, 
has been the central theme of historical medicine and medical ethics. Even 
modern medical codes of ethics, such as those drawn up by the American 
and World Medical Associations, have reflected this tradition. For 
example, it was not until the 1957 and 1980 formulations of the code of the 
AMA that there was a noted strengthening of attention to patients' rights 
pers pectives. 
Only in these very recent ve rsions .. . did the Hippoc ratic co mmitment to 
benefit exclusive ly the patient. according to the physic ia n's jud gment, begin to 
gi ve wa y to other ethical commitments - those that take into account the 
interests of the rest of society: . . . and those that take into account the 
judgme nt o f patie nt s and others beyond the phys ic ia n. ' 
On the other hand , attention to the principle of patient autonomy, while 
always incipient in commitments to respect for individuals, came to the 
fore in more recent times. The philosophical groundwork for the modern 
emphasis on autonomy is laid in the writings of Kant and Mill.5 In Kant, 
attention is given to the importance of the autonomous will as freely 
determining its own values - self-determination according to univer-
salizable moral principles accepted by the individual. Mill , on the other 
hand , gives his attention to freedom of action and thought as leading to the 
full development of the individual and , thereby, of society, Kant focuses 
on the internal development of will , while Mill focuses more on external 
lack of constraint. But in either case , respect for the autonomous decisions 
of others is a central value, both because of the inherent worth of the other 
(Kant) and because social liberty will be most conrlucive to the full 
flowering of the individual (Mill). 
Thus, the principle of autonomy has come to be defined as referring to 
self-rule, self-regulation, self-determination. "It asserts a right of non-
interference and , correlatively, an obligation not to constrain autonomous 
actions .. ,"6 The principle of autonomy, like that of beneficence-
paternalism, has been readily adapted to the setting of medical ethics and 
recently has been more and more expressed in legal decisions. A clear 
example of this is the following statement from Natanson v. Kline 
(Kansas, 1980): "A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of 
treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to 
substitute his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice 
or deception."7 Hence , it would appear that autonomy is beginning to take 
precedence over paternalism in contemporary medical ethics. And , in 
many circumstances, this is true. But its prominence has also brought 
increased attention to the concept of autonomy itself. And this attention is 
producing a modified and more sophisticated use of the principle . 
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This increased sophistication is showing itselffirst in a refinement of the 
definition of autonomy. This is being approached from two directions - a 
critique of the traditional definition and proposals for a deeper and more 
complex analysis of the concept. In both approaches, the influence of the 
clinical experience of medicine as well as sociological and psychological 
disciplines is apparent. 
The traditional understanding of autonomy has tended to focus on the 
principle in the abstract, i.e ., the right of self-determination which is a 
corollary of the fundamental worth and dignity of the individual human 
person. That the freedom of thought and action which which is presupposed 
by this principle does not readily appear in the world-as-experienced , soon 
became evident under the examination of the social and psychological 
sciences. Sociology proposed various levels of "soft" or "hard" 
determination of human behavior by social forces. Behaviorist psychology 
has agreed even to the point of questioning the validity of looking for 
internal determinants of human behavior. On the other hand, the 
Freudian tradition of psychology looks to intrapsychic forces as giving 
often unrecognized direction to only apparently conscious activity. 
Willard Gaylin concludes, "Putting it in a different way. increasing 
knowledge of the causes of human behavior red uces the role of a supposed 
free agent to whom we credit behavior."H The limits on autonomous 
actions imposed by factors such as age. mental capacity. etc .. were 
recogni zed in early philosophic analyses of the concept. but are being given 
greater weight in recent discussion. Thus there have been serious questions 
raised about the degree of true autonomy of persons assumed by the 
abstract definition of the principle . 
It is not only the pragmatic question of establishing relatively free 
self-determination which has been part of the critique of the traditional 
idea of autonomy. h has been found limited on a more philosophic level of 
analysis as well. William May, for example. has questioned the contractual 
model of relations between health care providers and patients. which 
seems to be implied by primary emphasis on autonomy. In its place he 
proposed the ideal of "covenant."9 This recognizes an obligation of the 
physician which goes beyond the specific duties imposed by individual acts 
of agreement. Such obligation calls for a more activist role for physicians 
in pursuing patient well-being. At the same time. covenantal bonds may 
call for patients to recognize certain areas of legitimate expertise and 
responsibility among health care providers. While May does not seek to 
restore the paternalistic model of medicine to prominence, an opening for 
a more restricted role for autonomy is present in his model. 
Daniel Callahan also finds the traditional statement of autonomy to be 
weak. On philosophical as well as practical grounds. he sees autonomy as a 
moral good which has been pushed into becoming a "moral obsession." 
This, in turn, has brought about a "minimalist ethic" which does not do 
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justice to the full human moral experience."lo Callahan summarizes this 
autonomy-based minimalist ethic in the proposition that "one may 
morally act in any way one chooses so far as one does not do harm to 
others."11 Such an ethic is faulty, he a rgues , on several grounds. (I) We are 
led to a society characterized by moral iso lation rather than moral 
community. (2) The existential intermingling of private and pu blic spheres 
is overlooked by a sharp distinction between them. (3) Moral dialogue 
over issues of social concern - e.g., the common good, justice, etc., - is 
reduced to bartering individual choices. (4) The sense of moral obligation 
is reduced in the direction of only those which are individually contracted . 
(5) The call to respect the autonomy of others can too easily lead to the 
overriding of one's conscience. Thus, Callahan, like May, sees the general 
concept of autonomy open to critique not only in terms of psycho-socia l I 
restrictions but in terms of philosophical shortcomings as well. 'I 
The second part of the refinement of the concept of autonomy, I 
concomitant with the critique just descri bed, has appeared in proposals for 
a more sophisticated definition or understanding of the experience of 
autonomy. Of particular note here are the analyses of Gerald Dvorkin and 
Bruce Miller. Dvorkin has suggested that autonomy be defined as 
"authenticity under the conditions of procedural independence." 12 Here he 
describes the two components of autonomy as independence and 
authenticity . The former is common to traditional definitions of 
autonomy. Dvorkin suggests we need to investigate actions which may 
prompt a person to do something without infringing on his freedom. His 
discussion of modes of behavior control suggests guidelines for such 
non-coercive activity. Among these are procedures which (I) support the 
ability to think rationally, (2) rely on knowledge rather than deception, (3) 
maintain the continuity of an individual's personal identity , and (4) 
depend on the active participation of the person. 
Dvorkin's other criteria, authenticity, is less fully eXp'lored than that of 
independence. However, it is clear that he is referring to lhe "ownership" of 
a person's motivations by that person. He is concerned that a person's 
choices, whatever prior conditioning they may have in family, society, etc., 
be his or her own. Thus , "it is the attitude a person takes towards the 
influences motivating him which determines whether or not they are to be 
considered 'his'. Does he identify with them, assimilate them to himself ... ?"I.l 
I n this manner, Dvorkin is beginning to deepen the concept of autonomy 
not only by exploring the ideal of independent action but by raising the 
question of the relation of action to the " true self'. 
Bruce M iller carries this type of analysis further. He distinguishes four 
senses of autonomy - autonomy as free action, as authenticity, as 
effective deliberation , and as moral refiection .14 Like Dvorkin , Miller 
stresses independence in his analysis of autonomy as free action . Action 
that is free he describes as voluntary, that is, "not the result of coercion, 
duress, or undue influence", and intentional , that is, the conscious goal of 
the person. Miller adds clarity to Dvorkin's idea of authenticity as an 
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aspect of autonomy. Authenticity, he argues, "means that an action is 
consistent with the person's attitudes , values, dispositions, and life plans. 
Roughly, the person is acting in character."1 5 
Autonomy as effective deliberation focuses on the process of decision 
making. This calls for knowledge of decision alternatives and the 
consequences of those alternatives, and a process of weighing or 
evaluating those alternatives. Recognizing that the health care provider 
may be tempted to equate effective deliberation with the patient agreeing 
with the professional medical advice, Miller proposes safeguards which he 
thinks may hold such a possibility in check . He suggests that the patient's 
knowledge should not be viewed as having to be equivalent to the 
physicia n's , and that the rationality of the weighing or evaluation should 
be viewed in the context of consistency with the patient's other values (cf. 
authenticity) rather than the doctor's values. 16 M iller pushes the concept of 
deliberation even further in the direction of self-knowledge as assumed in 
the idea of autonomy as moral reflection . This sense of autonomy is seen as 
the "deepest" and "most demanding" because it involves "reflection on 
one's complete set of values, attitudes and life plans. It requires rigorous 
self-analysis, awareness of alternative sets of values , commitment to a 
method for assessing them , and an ability to put them into place."1 7 While 
M iller seems to view this sense of autonomy as separate from the others, it 
might equally be seen as a deeper form of authenticity, i.e., a bringing to 
full consciousness and reflection of the values central to one's self. 
II 
Thus , we have seen a clarification and an increase in sophistication of 
the understanding of autonomy. Having been tested against the critique of 
socio-psychological analysis and philosophical questioning, autonomy 
has grown to be defined more carefully in terms of levels of experience 
from uncoerced thought and action to the correlation of action with the 
core identity values of the reflective self. Accompanying'this refining of the 
definition of autonomy is an increased recognition of limited autonomy 
and an appreciation of its significance for the obligation to respect patient 
self-determination. It has become standard to recognize certain natural 
limitations to those types of persons who can be considered autonomous. 
Those who lack full mental ability, e.g. , children, the senile, the greatly 
retarded , the comatose, etc., are normally seen as non-autonomous , as are 
the mentally ill , those temporarily irrational due to drug-dependence, and 
those who are coerced. In situations such as these, there is a general 
acceptance of the moral legitimacy of beneficent proxy consent. Such 
consent is , as we shall see below, in the broadest sense of the word , 
paternalism - a choice made for someone else based on benefit to that 
person. 
The concept of limited autonomy, however, has been given even further 
exploration. On the more theoretical level, Bruce Miller returns to his 
fourfold analysis of autonomy to suggest that autonomy can be limited in 
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one of several ways.I S (I) The patient may not be autonomous if action or 
choice is not free, that is , if the person is being coerced by factors external , 
or perhaps even internal, to himself. (2) The autonomy of a person may be 
questioned if the patient is acting "out of character", i.e. , not authentically 
in keeping with his known pattern of values , dispositions , etc. (3) If the 
patient does not have a reasonable knowledge of alternative choices and 
their consequences, or seems to be evaluating them on criteria out of 
keeping with previously established values, he may not be acting 
autonomously. (4) Miller has some difficulty in applying the fourth sense 
of autonomy - moral reflection - to determining that a person may have 
limited autonomy. But since there seems to be a natural linkage between 
what Miller calls moral reflection and the more general phenomenon of 
what he calls authenticity, we may be able to treat them as one 
phenomenon. Thus, in order to determine the non-autonomy, and thereby 
candidacy for paternalistic treatment, of a patient , Miller would have us 
assess the natural or situationally induced limitations in these forms of 
autonomy. 
In an even more specific way, the effect of illness on autonomy can be 
examined. Mark Komrad , noting that "autonomy is neither permanent 
nor immutable , but . .. a dynamic state liable to perturbation" and that 
physical distress can interfere with both reasoning and freedom of action, 
suggests that "all illness represents a state of diminished autonomy."19 
Following Dvorkin's categories , Eric Cassell notes that illness may a ffect 
both authenticity and independence. 2o Physical changes may cause a 
patient to lose, at least temporarily, a sense of continuing personal identity. 
And pain and suffering may impair clear thinking, especially in light of the 
limited medical knowledge a patient may have access to or understand. 
Thus both authenticity and independence of action may be diminished. 
Younger and Jackson , medical faculty members at Case Western Reserve 
University, spell out further ways in which illness and tJle resulting clinical 
setting of a patient can cause action that is not truly autonomous.21 
Patients' decisions can be based on temporary reactive depression, on fear 
arising from misperception or misinformation concerning one's status. 
They may be an expression of only one side of what are actually 
ambivalent feelings, or of a symbolic attempt to gain control of their 
situation through arbitrary choice of actions contrary to the decisions of 
those around them, whether family or medical staff. 
Although the judgment that a given patient is non-autonomous in any 
of the senses cited above is not always an easy task and may be open to 
abuse by an overzealous or undersensitive health care provider, there 
seems little doubt that limited autonomy is a real phenomenon and , as 
such, must be considered in any complete moral analysis of issues 
surrounding patient self-determination. What preliminary conclusions 
might be drawn from decisions about action in such contexts? Is this a 
situation in which paternalism may be called on to be the active moral 
principle? The answer seems to be a modified "yes" on two counts . 
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Paternalism, as traditionally defined, is set in strong contrast to respect 
for autonomy. Modifying Dvorkin's widely cited definition, Jane 
Zembaty defines paternalism as "interference with a person's autonomy 
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, 
needs, interests or values of the person being constrained."22 To the degree 
that paternalism is understood as action contrary to another person's 
autonomy, one might argue that decisions for patients of limited 
autonomy are not actually paternalistic, i.e., we cannot violate the 
autonomy of one who is not autonomous or is so only to a limited degree . 
"Sound decision making need not run counter to patient autonomy: it can 
involve the judgment that the patient's ... (decision) ... is not autonomous 
in the appropriate sense."23 The action is, then, simply one of proxy 
consent, in which the primary moral principle is beneficence.24 
Or can we begin our definition of paternalism closer to the concept of 
beneficent proxy consent and see it as justified when (l) harms prevented 
or benefits provided to the person outweigh interference with 
independence, and (2) the person's condition is one of seriously limited 
autonomy, and (3) such interference would be universalizable to similar 
circumstances 25 Those who follow this approach make significant use of 
Joel Feinberg's distinction between strong and weak paternalism. The 
former , according to Beauchamp and Childress, involves actions "to 
protect a person by limiting his or her liberty even when that person's 
choices are informed and voluntary," whereas weak paternalism occurs 
where the person's actions are non-voluntary or insubstantially 
informed. 2~ Such weak paternalism may also take two forms. It may lead 
to actual proxy consent, there being no or insufficient autonomy to be 
considered violated . Or it may involve temporary intervention or refusal to 
comply with the patient's wishes until it can be established that his or her 
choices are, in fact, voluntary, that is, weak paternalism may be invoked 
until the person's autonomy of action can be verified. l his seems clearly 
one of the strong motivations of those proposing delay in immediate 
response to certain patient wishes. 27 
Thus, viewed in the light of the recognition of the phenomenon of 
limited autonomy, a form of paternalism may occur which is not at its core 
a true violation of respect for autonomy. On the one hand , autonomy is 
not violated if autonomy is not actually present. On the other, autonomy is 
actually upheld since the intervention is limited to the time necessary to 
ascertain autonomy. If autonomy is found to be present and being acted 
on, it is then recognized and the person's choice of action honored. 
III 
There is one further way in which the use of the idea of autonomy in 
recent medical ethics is being revised. The discussion above has basically 
seen the concept of autonomy in static terms, as a principle to be honored 
or rejected in favor of another principle. Even paternalistic intervention 
viewed autonomy either as a principle that did not apply (i .e. , where the 
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patient was not a utonomous) or one that could be applied as soon as the 
patient's autonomous condition was confirmed. But an important variant 
of this outlook is a lso emerging - one which sees autonomy not just as a 
moral principle, but also as a therapeutic goal. 
Recognizing the phenomenon of limited autonomy, Eric Casse ll sees it 
not simply as a status to be acknowledged , but as a debility to be overcome, 
a weakness to be reversed , a deficient ability which needs strengthening. As 
previously noted , he sees illness as imparing autonomy. But, for Cassell, the 
goal of medicine is not just the treatment of disease entities. He states, "I 
believe the function of medicine is to prese rve autonomy ... It is obvious 
that the best way to preserve autonomy is to cure the patient of the disease 
that impairs autonomy and return him to his normallife."28 Paternalism, 
pa rticula rly the weak paternalism described a bove, thus honors autonomy 
by seeking to bring it about. The goal of physician paternalism is not simply 
to be the imposition of a preferred course of treatment, but the maintaining 
or restoring of patient autonomy so that it can be exercised and honored in 
future treatment choices. Mark Komrad makes this point forcefully. 
The restitution of diminished autonomy is the on ly rationaliza tion of medical 
paternalism that does not profa ne a utonomy. The admoni tion that a 
physic ian should ' respec t the patient's autonomy' does not exp licit y 
acknowledge that a pa ti ent presents a condition of incomplete autonomy. 
Rathe r. one might more approp riate ly ask instead that t he doctor respect the 
patient's pOIenlialfor auronol11.1'. The maximizat ion of a utonomy wit hin the 
bo unds of the patient's po tentia l seems to me a legitima te goa l of the 
thera peutic encounter . . . The raison d 'e lre of limited paternalism is to 
prese rve a n individual's freedom as much as poss ible in the hope of eventua ll y 
broadening it. 
Jane Zembaty takes a similar position and justifies it against presumed 
utilitarian and deontological defenders of a stricter interpretation of the 
principle of respect for autonomy. Against the utilitaria n, she a rgues, "As 
long as the high value placed on individual autonomy serves as the ground 
for the utilitarian rejection of medical paternalism, it would seem 
incoherent to claim that paternalistic actions intended 10 preserve that 
autonomy are ethically unjustifiable;" and against the deontologist, she 
suggests, " If the patient's humanity or personhood consists in 'choosng 
and being able to judge his own ends,' then paternalistic actions whose 
intent is to preserve the individual's ability to choose or judge his own ends 
would again seem to be justified ."30 
The importance of this position, i.e., autonomy as a therapeutic goal , is 
twofold. First, it recognizes the dynamic nature of human phenomena, 
autonomy in particular, and draws it away from abstraction and more 
closely into the world as lived by real patients and real health care 
providers . And second, it may help inhibit the all too easy slip from weak 
to strong paternalism. Keeping autonomy as a conscious goal of medical 
treatment maintains a higher priority on long term and ultimate patient 
self-determination. 
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Conclusion 
Although paternalism, particularly strong paternalism, no longer plays 
the dominant role in medical ethics today, it is also clear that the principle 
of respect for autonomy has itself undergone some modification. Robert 
Veatch, one of patient autonomy's strongest proponents in contemporary 
medical ethics, may still argue that "the case is overwhelming that 
autonomy takes moral precedence over paternalism. Respecting the 
patient's autonomy always takes precedence over benefitting the patient 
against the patient's autonomous will."31 But most of even those who agree 
with him in general have begun to refine what they would mean by such a 
statement. 
The a bstract definition of autonomy has been tempered by the 
recognition of its several levels as an ex istential human phenomenon . The 
acknowledgement of the clinical reality of limited autonomy has opened 
the door for a modest accommod ation with paternalism, at least with 
weak paternalism. This type of paterna lism is seen to maintain a certain 
deference to the principle of respect for autonomy. This deference is 
especially seen in the emergence of autonomy as a therapeutic goal for 
medicine. It remains on the agenda for future medical ethics to pursue 
specification and implications of these refinements. 
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